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Gone but Not Forgotten:
When Privacy, Policy and Privilege Collide
By Louise L. Hill*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Emerging technology has brought new methods for transmitting communications.
Concomitant with this, the use of computers, the Internet, e-mail, and other electronic
communication devices has been embraced in the workplace and in private settings.1 As
these tools for communicating information become part of everyday life, issues
associated with their use continue to evolve, many of which relate to confidentiality and
privilege. With respect to the workplace itself, most businesses have established policies
that relate to Internet use and electronic communications, although “occasional, personal
use of the Internet is commonplace.”2 An issue that has arisen of late relates to
information that employers retrieve from the computers that their employees use and the
effect this has on employee communications that otherwise would be shielded by the
attorney-client privilege.
The jurisdictions are divided about whether employees give up the protection of
attorney-client privilege when they use a company-issued computer to send or receive emails. Distinguishing factors, such as the type of e-mail system used, the company
policy that is in place, and notice and enforcement of the policy, are among the things
considered when the courts evaluate the issue. This Article begins by examining the law
of confidentiality and privilege and addressing the matter of privacy in the workplace. It
then examines divergent positions that courts have taken on the issue of computer use in
the workplace, attorney-client privilege, and work product protection, as well as the
impact of these holdings. This Article concludes by positing a position which relates to
privacy in the workplace, balancing an employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy
with public policy concerns and lawyer responsibility.
II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY

¶3

Attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence, applicable in civil and criminal court
proceedings, that “limits the extent to which a party in litigation can force from an
unwilling witness a statement or document that is protected as confidential.”3 It is “based
on a pragmatic judgment that confidentiality is necessary in order to encourage client

*

Professor of Law, School of Law, Widener University.
See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 654 (N.J. 2010).
2
Id. at 655.
3
Charles W. Wolfram, The U.S. Law of Client Confidentiality: Framework for an International
Perspective, 15 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 529, 541–42 (1992).
1
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communication.”4 Such open consultation with lawyers is acknowledged “as providing a
significant benefit to society.”5 However, while these attributes are recognized, the
privilege is also viewed as “an obstacle to the investigation of the truth,” which “ought to
be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle.”6
Each state in the United States has its own privilege rules, which generally follow
the common law doctrine, while Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs
federal courts.7 Rather than establishing fixed rules for attorney-client privilege, the
Supreme Court determined that Rule 501 allows privilege issues to be decided on a caseby-case basis.8 The federal common law of privilege applies when the substantive rights
of the parties are determined by federal law, while state privilege law applies if the
underlying matter is governed by state law.9
As a general premise, attorney-client privilege attaches to confidential
communications made between lawyer and client for the purpose of obtaining or
providing legal assistance.10 “Under federal law, ‘[a] client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the
client,’ between the client and the client’s lawyer . . . .”11 In general, “[a] communication
is confidential when the circumstances indicate that it was not intended to be disclosed to
third persons other than (1) those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of
legal services to the client, or (2) those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the

4

Id. at 544. The privilege has been traced to Roman times when attorneys were servants of those whose
affairs they managed and, under Roman law, could not testify for or against their masters because the
relationship created a duty of loyalty. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication
Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 487–88 (1928).
5
J. Triplett Mackintosh & Kristen M. Angus, Conflict in Confidentiality: How E.U. Laws Leave In-House
Counsel Outside the Privilege, 38 INT’L LAW. 35, 38 (2004).
6
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE ET AL., EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291, at 554 (4th ed., rev.
1961).
7
See Daiske Yoshida, The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Communications with Foreign
Legal Professionals, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 212–13 (1997).
8
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981). The Supreme Court acknowledged that this
approach could “undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at
396–97. Some feel this has resulted in confusion and inconsistencies, creating “practical difficulties for
attorneys and other legal advisors.” Yoshida, supra note 7, at 214.
9
FED. R. EVID. 501 (“Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as
to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.”).
10
See Wolfram, supra note 3, at 542.
11
In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 255 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting SUP. CT.
STANDARD 503). Proposed Rule 503 was not adopted as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence but was
“promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, and . . . ‘should be regarded as an authoritative
source of the principles of [federal] common law.’” Id. at 255 n.6 (quoting BARRY RUSSELL, BANKRUPTCY
EVIDENCE MANUAL § 501.2, at 798 (2004)).
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communication.”12
There is both a subjective and objective component to
confidentiality. The client must intend to give the communication in confidence and
must reasonably understand it to have been so given.13
A. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
¶6

Attorney-client privilege can be waived; waiver is absolute and “construed broadly
against the party claiming the privilege.”14 Waiver of attorney-client privilege can result
from intentional voluntary disclosure as well as from inadvertent disclosure.15 “The
client, not counsel, can voluntarily waive the privilege.”16 If a client willingly shares a
privileged communication with someone who is non-privileged, “a court will feel free to
find that, in this instance, the assurance of confidentiality was not important to the client,

12

Id. at 255 (quoting 3 HON. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 503.15 at 503–57 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997)).
13
See, e.g., Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a “privilege holder must
prove the communication was ‘(1) intended to remain confidential and (2) . . . was reasonably expected
and understood to be confidential’”).
United States v. Bell, 776 F.2d 965, 971 (11th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding that “[a] communication is protected . . . if it is intended to remain confidential and . . .
was reasonably expected and understood to be confidential”).
14
Mackintosh & Angus, supra note 5, at 43.
15
Wolfram, supra note 3, at 544. Waiver can also result from the offensive use of what would otherwise
be privileged communications. The offensive use doctrine comes into play when a party to a proceeding
introduces an issue related to advice received from a lawyer, impliedly waiving the confidentiality of the
communication. See Mackintosh & Angus, supra note 5, at 43 n.57 (citing Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co.,
974 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1992)). Over the years, courts have differed on the application of this doctrine. See
Louise L. Hill, Emerging Technology and Client Confidentiality: How Changing Technology Brings
Ethical Dilemmas, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 11–12 (2010). Some courts find the privilege waived if
protected information is integral to the outcome of issues in the lawsuit. See, e.g., Mortg. Guarantee & Title
Co. v. Cunha, 745 A.2d 156, 159 (R.I. 2000). Some courts require the privileged material to be “outcome
determinative” for there to be waiver. See, e.g., Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex.
1993). Still other courts have determined that waiver should be found when assertion of the privilege is the
result of a party’s affirmative act. See, e.g., Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975) (“[T]he
asserting party put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and [] application of
the privilege would . . . den[y] the opposing party access to information vital to his defense.”). In 2008,
the Second Circuit invoked the remedy of mandamus to clarify the uncertainty surrounding “at issue”
waivers. In re County of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 224, 226 (2d Cir. 2008). An assertion that information is
relevant is not enough for there to be waiver. Rather, for there to be waiver “a party must rely on
privileged advice from his counsel to make his claim or defense.” Id. at 229.
The attorney-client privilege does not apply to a communication occurring when a client:
(a) consults a lawyer for the purpose, later accomplished, of obtaining assistance to engage in
a crime or fraud or aiding a third person to do so, or
(b) regardless of the client’s purpose at the time of consultation, uses the lawyer’s advice or
other services to engage in or assist a crime or fraud.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000). Known as the crime-fraud
exception, work product immunity for a client is also barred if the client used the attorney’s assistance to
perpetrate a crime or fraud. See In re Green Grand Jury Proceedings, 492 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2007).
16
Mackintosh & Angus, supra note 5, at 42–43.
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and that the general policy of free access by adversaries to all relevant evidence should
prevail.”17
Opinion differs on whether attorney-client privilege is waived when there is
inadvertent disclosure. Usually, when approaching the issue of inadvertent disclosure,
one of three tests is applied: (1) the “strict responsibility test,” under which any
disclosure, even inadvertent disclosure, waives attorney-client privilege;18 (2) the
“subjective intent test,” under which inadvertent disclosure does not waive attorney-client
privilege since waiver requires an intention to waive;19 and (3) the “balancing test,” under
which waiver is determined by an evaluation of the circumstances.20 The most popular of
the three tests is the balancing test, under which courts generally determine waiver by
considering the reasonableness of precautions taken to prevent disclosure, the time taken
to recognize the error, the scope of the production, the extent of the disclosure, and
considerations of fairness and justice.21
Recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence attempt to resolve the
conflicting decisions about the effect of inadvertent disclosure in federal court litigation.
Rule 502(b) essentially provides that disclosure of privileged material does not result in
the waiver of attorney-client privilege, as long as: “(1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2)
the [party responsible for the disclosure] took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and
(3) the [party responsible for the disclosure] promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the
error” after it occurred.22 The new rule also attempts to resolve the dispute about whether
17

Wolfram, supra note 3, at 544. In litigation, it is generally felt that parties with allied interests should be
able to communicate and coordinate their positions in order to more effectively present their claims.
Therefore, two or more parties with a common interest that “is the subject of confidential communications
generally are allowed to share this information with each other without losing the attorney-client privilege.”
Joan C. Rogers, Confidentiality of Corporate Information May Be Waived or Lost in Many Ways, 16 Laws.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 376 (July 19, 2000).
18
The strict responsibility test is the traditional test, which puts the “risk of insufficient precautions []on the
client.” WIGMORE ET AL., supra note 6, § 2325(3), at 633. The rationale for the strict view is that privilege
acts as an obstacle to discovery of the truth; disclosure of privileged materials makes it impossible to
achieve the benefits of privilege; therefore, “when the policy underlying the rule can no longer be served, it
would amount to no more than mechanical obedience to a formula to continue to recognize it.” Vincent S.
Walkowiak, Sarah E. Lemons & Thomas J. Leach, Loss of Attorney-Client Privilege Through Inadvertent
Disclosure of Privileged Documents, in ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: PROTECTING
AND DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 313, 316 (Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., 3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE] (quoting United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465
(E.D. Mich. 1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19
The subjective intent test is the most lenient approach, the rationale of which is “that ‘inadvertent
production is the antithesis’ of an intentional relinquishment of a known right and, if privilege is for the
welfare of the client, more than the attorney’s negligence should be required before the client loses the
privilege.” Walkowiak, Lemons & Leach, supra note 18, at 318 (quoting Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene
Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982)).
20
See Mackintosh & Angus, supra note 5, at 43 n.58; Rogers, supra note 17.
21
See Mackintosh & Angus, supra note 5, at 43 n.58. Although routinely presented as a multi-factor test, it
has been asserted that courts primarily concentrate on only “two considerations—the conduct of the client
and lawyer claiming the privilege, and the prejudice to the party to whom the privileged material was
disclosed should the court uphold the privilege despite disclosure.” Walkowiak, Lemons & Leach, supra
note 18, at 321.
22
FED. R. EVID. 502(b). The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules noted the following with respect to
the amendment:
The rule establishes a compromise between two competing premises. On the one hand,
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waiver attaches only to those documents or communications that are inadvertently
disclosed, or whether it extends to all communications on the subject covered by the
inadvertently disclosed communications. The rule takes the position held by the majority
of courts, which is that any waiver resulting from inadvertent disclosure is generally
limited to the material which is actually disclosed.23 Additionally, the rule provides that a
disclosure first made in state court does not waive the privilege in federal court
proceedings (unless the disclosure would be a waiver in a federal court proceeding or
under the law of the state where the disclosure occurred),24 and a federal court order that
privilege is not waived extends the protection to other federal and state court
proceedings.25
B. Work-Product Immunity
¶9

Along with the attorney-client privilege, the law of confidentiality in the United
States recognizes the doctrine of work-product immunity, which protects material from
discovery that a lawyer generates in preparing a matter for litigation.26 It is a qualified
privilege that “shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area
within which he can analyze and prepare his client’s case.”27 Unlike attorney-client
privilege, work-product immunity does not turn on the expectation or intent that a
communication remain confidential. A lawyer can disclose work product to persons not
assisting the lawyer in trial preparation without losing immunity status, as long as “the
disclosure does not create a substantial risk of divulgence to an adversary in litigation.”28
However, like attorney-client privilege, work-product protection, which can be either
“ordinary work product” or “opinion work product,” can be waived.29
information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work product protection should not be
treated lightly. On the other hand, a rule imposing strict liability for an inadvertent disclosure
threatens to impose prohibitive costs for privilege review and retention, especially in cases
involving electronic discovery.
Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee Note on Subdivision (b), at 11 (June 30, 2006),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Excerpt_EV_Report_Pub.pdf.
23
FED. R. EVID. 502(a) (Waiver extends to all related material on the same subject “only if: (1) the waiver
is intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject
matter; and (3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.”).
24
Id. 501(c).
25
Id. 501(d).
26
See Wolfram, supra note 3, at 542–43. Protected material must be prepared in anticipation of litigation,
which must be more than a “remote prospect,” but need not necessarily be imminent. In re Special
September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 64, 64 n.19 (7th Cir. 1980).
27
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (2006) (repealed
2007) (“[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable . . . and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s
representative . . . only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party’s case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when
the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.”).
28
Wolfram, supra note 3, at 543–44.
29
See In re Green Grand Jury Proceedings, 492 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2007).
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Ordinary work product consists of raw factual information, while opinion work
product consists of mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.30 Since
the work-product doctrine protects the attorney’s materials, the attorney may waive the
benefit of the privilege.31 The client can waive the privilege as to ordinary work product,
while the attorney may contest the waiver as to opinion work product.32 There are some
situations in which work-product protection can be overcome by an opposing party, such
as when the opposing party demonstrates a substantial need for the work-product
materials.33 However, with respect to opinion work product, this type of material “is
discoverable, if at all, only upon a showing of compelling need.”34
C. Ethical Obligations Relating to Confidentiality

¶11

The law of confidentiality in the United States is also composed of an ethical
obligation to maintain client confidences. This ethical duty is “not limited to judicial or
other proceedings, but rather appl[ies] in all representational contexts,”35 covering all
information relating to the representation, not just client communications.36 The
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), on
which the states’ professional conduct rules are based,37 call for information relating to
30

Id.
See Carte Blanche (Singapore) PTE., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 28, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
32
See Buck v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., No. 91-2832, 1992 WL 130024, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 1992). A
lawyer’s independent work-product privilege is considered as a separate matter. See infra note 34.
33
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3), provides:
Trial Preparation: Materials.
Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and
tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party
or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent). But, subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may be discovered if:
they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and
the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot,
without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.
Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those materials, it must
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories
of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.
34
Rogers, supra note 17. As with attorney-client privilege, work-product protection may also be lost by a
showing of a crime or fraud. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. However, since a lawyer’s
independent work-product privilege is considered a separate matter, a lawyer may assert the work-product
doctrine with regard to opinion work product even if the client has used the lawyer’s services for criminal
or fraudulent purposes, provided the lawyer was unaware that the client was doing so. See In re Green
Grand Jury Proceedings, 492 F.3d at 981 (“[W]e hold, as have our sister circuits, that an attorney who is
not complicit in his client’s wrongdoing may assert the work product privilege with respect to his opinion
work product.”).
35
Arthur Garwin, Confidentiality and Its Relationship to the Attorney-Client Privilege, in ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra note 18, at 31, 31.
36
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
37
California remains the only state that has legal ethics rules that do not comport with the ABA Model
Rule format. Model Rules: Maine’s Shift to Model Rules Allows MJP, Preserves Unique Aspects of Former
Code, 25 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 135 (Mar. 18, 2009). While most states in the United
States have adopted the Model Rules, lawyers are not provided with a uniform standard since
interpretational differences exist among the jurisdictions, as do differences in the text of some of the rules.
31
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the representation of a client to be held in confidence.38 Found at Model Rule 1.6, this
obligation attaches irrespective of the source of the information,39 with only limited
exceptions.40 Breach of the obligation of confidentiality can subject a lawyer to
professional discipline.41 Occasionally, although not pursuant to the Model Rules, a
client can obtain damage recovery if a lawyer unjustifiably divulges confidential
information that results in the client being harmed.42
¶12
Due to the proliferation of electronic communications and the increase of their
inadvertent transmission, the matter of dissemination of inadvertent communications is
also addressed by the Model Rules.43 To that end, Model Rule 4.4(b) specifically
provides:
A lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s
client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently
sent shall promptly notify the sender.44

¶13

Such notification enables the sender to take protective measures. However, the
commentary to the rule specifically notes that additional steps to be taken by the lawyer,
See Louise L. Hill, Electronic Communications and the 2002 Revisions to the Model Rules, 16 ST. JOHN’S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 529, 531 (2002).
38
Model Rule 1.6, which addresses confidentiality of information, provides:
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).
39
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 cmt. b (2000).
40
The Model Rule exceptions to the general prohibition against disclosure of client information are
permissive rather than mandatory. Pursuant to Model Rule 1.6, lawyers are permitted to:
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result
in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of
which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a
crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in
any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client; or
(6) to comply with other law or a court order.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2009).
41
See Wolfram, supra note 3, at 545.
42
Id.
43
See Hill, supra note 15, at 21–22. “Because of the ease of electronic transmission and the volume of
material being exchanged, it has not been unusual for a document, or material embedded in a document, to
be inadvertently transmitted.” Id. at 45. This is particularly prevalent during electronic discovery within
the context of civil litigation. Id.
44
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009).
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such as returning the document, as well as whether the privileged status of the document
has been waived, are beyond the scope of the rule.45
III. EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
¶14

A right to privacy is recognized under both the common law and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and in each case, the expectation of
privacy must be reasonable.46 Just as with confidentiality, there are both subjective and
objective components to the expectation of privacy.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated” . . . [and] guarantees the privacy, dignity, and
security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the
Government . . . .47

For Fourth Amendment purposes, a person must show “a subjective expectation of
privacy . . . that society accepts as objectively reasonable.”48
¶15
The concerns surrounding the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment privacy
claim are different from those that arise in the private employer setting.49 In the latter
situation, a person who asserts the tort of “intrusion upon seclusion” must show a
subjective expectation of privacy which is objectively reasonable.50 The tort typically
provides that “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.”51 The standard employed is a strict one, calling for the establishment of an
intrusion that “would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man, as the result of
conduct to which the reasonable man would strongly object.”52

45

Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 2.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (holding that Fourth Amendment applicability depends
on whether person can claim a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy that has been
invaded); Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 260 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff asserting
cause of action for invasion of privacy must show “reasonable expectation of privacy”).
47
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n,, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989).
48
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
49
See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 397–98 (4th Cir. 2000) (involving search warrant for CIA
employee’s computer on which pornographic images of minors were found); Stengart v. Loving Care
Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 663 (N.J. 2010) (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714–19 (1987))
(discussing search of public hospital employee’s workplace as a violation of the employee’s expectation of
privacy under Fourth Amendment); State v. M.A., 954 A.2d 503, 510–13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)
(involving Fourth Amendment analysis of search of State Police employee’s computer and subsequent theft
charges).
50
Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002).
51
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
52
Id. § 652B cmt. d. This article is focusing on the private employment setting, rather than when the
employer is a government entity.
46
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A. Electronic Communications
¶16

No authority exists which suggests that privilege is unavailable simply because a
lawyer and client communicate via Internet e-mail.53 In fact, federal statutory
prohibitions against intercepting these communications render them “sufficiently private
to satisfy the conditions for the attorney-client privilege to apply.”54 Under the Federal
Wiretap Act, intentional interception of wire or electronic communications is prohibited;
furthermore, interception of these communications does not waive any otherwise
available privilege.55 As far as a lawyer’s obligation to a client is concerned, lawyers are
not required to use “all available technology to prevent interception” when
communicating with clients.56 Only steps that are reasonable under the circumstances are
necessary.57
¶17
In 1999, an American Bar Association committee addressed the matter of
mandatory encryption of e-mail, and concluded that a lawyer may communicate with
clients via e-mail without using encryption.58 The committee reasoned that the
expectation of privacy for e-mail is the same as that for ordinary telephone calls,59 and
the unauthorized interception of an electronic message is illegal. It was noted, however,
that unusual circumstances involving extraordinarily sensitive information might warrant
enhanced security measures like encryption, just as ordinary telephones and other typical
means of communication would be deemed inadequate to protect confidentiality in some
situations.60
B. Electronic Communications in the Workplace & Company Policies
¶18

In many instances in the workplace, employees use computer equipment owned by
the employer and send and receive e-mails over the company’s e-mail system. This
53

See David Hricik, Confidentiality & Privilege in High-Tech Communications, 60 TEX. B.J. 104, 116
(1997).
54
Confidentiality: Electronic Communications Practice Guide, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA),
55:401 (1996).
55
The Federal Wiretap Act provides that “[n]o otherwise privileged wire, oral, or electronic communication
intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged
character.” 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (2006) (citation omitted). The Act also forbids the disclosure or use of
unlawfully intercepted communications and bars the introduction into evidence of unlawfully intercepted
conversations. Id. § 2515. As amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, e-mail is protected
from interception by the Federal Wiretap Act in that it is an electronic communication. Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. no. 99-508, § 101(a), 100 Stat. 1848, 1848–1849 (1986)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 2510).
56
Confidentiality: Electronic Communications Practice Guide, supra note 54 (quoting C. MUELLER & L.
KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE § 5.13, at 491–92 (1995)).
57
Id.
58
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999).
59
During most of the twentieth century, lawyers routinely used the telephone to communicate with clients.
Even though telephone company employees could listen in on these land-line calls, which could also be
intercepted by third parties, people had an expectation that these conversations would be private. See
Confidentiality: Electronic Communications Practice Guide, supra note 54. This expectation of privacy is
reflected in the Federal Wiretap Act, which prohibits intentional interception of wire or electronic
communications, and provides that interception does not waive any otherwise available privilege. See supra
note 55.
60
Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 58.
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equipment can also be used by employees to access a web-based personal e-mail account,
the occasional use of which is considered common in the workplace.61 It is recognized
that employers have the right, if not the responsibility, to monitor workplace use of
computers to prevent harm to the company. They can adopt and enforce “lawful policies
relating to computer use to protect the assets, reputation, and productivity of a business
and to ensure compliance with legitimate corporate policies.”62 However, it has been
noted that “a policy that banned all personal computer use and provided unambiguous
notice that an employer could retrieve and read an employee’s attorney-client
communications, if accessed on a personal, password-protected e-mail account using the
company’s computer system[,] would not be enforceable.”63
¶19
There are a variety of ways that an employer can access or monitor an employee’s
computer use. Some employers track time spent at the keyboard as well as keystrokes
and content.64 Others retain and review e-mail messages, or store and review employees’
computer files.65 When a computer is used, the hard disk makes a “‘screen shot’ of all it
sees, which the computer then stores in a temporary file, including e-mails retrieved from
a private password-protected e-mail account on the Internet.”66 These temporary files are
not readily available to the average user, although a forensic computer expert can access
and retrieve them.67 Some employees are unaware that a record may exist of their
Internet and e-mail use at work.68
¶20
Many company policies that address electronic communications state the
company’s rights with respect to access and review; that such communications are part of
the company’s business; and that they are not to be considered private or personal to any
individual employee. Often, employees are asked to sign an acknowledgment that they
are aware of the applicable communications policy. While company policies vary
significantly, the proffered policy regarding electronic communications at issue in
Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc. is somewhat typical, providing in part:
The company reserves and will exercise the right to review, audit, intercept,
access, and disclose all matters on the company’s media systems and services at
any time, with or without notice.
....
E-mail and voice mail messages, internet use and communication and computer
files are considered part of the company’s business and client records. Such
communications are not to be considered private or personal to any individual
employee.
61

See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010).
Id. at 665. Employers “may discipline employees and, when appropriate, terminate them, for violating
proper workplace rules that are not inconsistent with a clear mandate of public policy.” Id.
63
Id.
64
See Adam C. Losey, Clicking Away Confidentiality: Workplace Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, 60
FLA. L. REV. 1179, 1181 (2008).
65
Id. As of 2006, eighty percent of employers regularly monitored Internet use by employees. Id.
66
Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs., Inc. v. Evans, No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *4 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Aug. 3, 2006).
67
Id.
68
See Losey, supra note 64, at 1181.
62
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The principal purpose of electronic mail (e-mail) is for company business
communications. Occasional personal use is permitted; however, the system
should not be used to solicit for outside business ventures, charitable
organizations, or for any political or religious purpose, unless authorized by the
Director of Human Resources.69

The policy also prohibits certain uses of e-mail,70 and states that “[a]buse of the
electronic communications system may result in disciplinary action up to and including
separation of employment.”71
¶21
Depending on the underlying electronic communication policy of a company, it
may be that use of a company computer diminishes the expectation of privacy that an
employee reasonably may have. This may lead to a determination that a communication
was not made in confidence, or that an electronic communication will lose its privileged
character due to waiver.
C. Expectation of Privacy in the Workplace
¶22

An approach to evaluating an employee’s claim of privacy in files stored on
company computers is to examine the reasonableness of the employee’s expectation. An
employee’s expectation of privacy in the workplace “may be reduced by virtue of actual
office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation”; thus, a reasonable
expectation of privacy must be decided on a case-by-case basis.72 In making this
determination with respect to an employee’s computer files and e-mail, courts have
considered: (1) whether the company maintains a policy banning personal use; (2)
whether the company monitors the employee’s computer or e-mail use; (3) whether third
parties have a right of access to the computer or e-mails; and (4) whether the company
notified the employee, or the employee was aware, of the use and monitoring policies.73
69

Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 657 (N.J. 2010).
Specifically prohibited is “sending inappropriate sexual, discriminatory, or harassing messages, chain
letters, ‘[m]essages in violation of government laws,’ or messages relating to job searches, business
activities unrelated to [the employer], or political activities.” Id.
71
Id.
72
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717, 718 (1987).
73
See In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). In In re Asia Global
Crossing, the Bankruptcy Court recognized these considerations and, in terms of its analysis, assumed
certain e-mails were privileged and were subjectively intended to be confidential. Id. at 257–58. The court
then considered whether any attorney-client privilege was waived with respect to communications sent over
an employer e-mail system without encryption, finding a determination could not be made without further
development of the record relating to employer policy and monitoring. Id. at 261. However, any attorneyclient privilege was waived with respect to e-mail communications between employees and their lawyers
that had been copied to company counsel or forwarded to a company consultant. Id. at 261–62. Compare
Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy
exists where the employer announces he can inspect workplace computers), United States v. Simons, 206
F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy exists where the employer has
a policy of auditing employees’ computer use and the employee does not assert he was unaware of the
policy), Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467-ST, 2004 WL 2066746, at *18–21 (D. Or. Sept. 15,
2004) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy exists where an employee handbook warns that the
employer has the right to monitor files and e-mail), Kelleher v. City of Reading, No. 01-3386, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9408, at *24–25 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2002) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in
workplace e-mail exists where the employer’s guidelines informs employees that there is no expectation of
70
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The correlation between the objectively reasonable expectation of privacy and the
objective reasonableness of the intent that a communication be given in confidence is a
close one.74 Accordingly, it has been held that “the objective reasonableness of that
intent will depend on the company’s e-mail policies regarding use and monitoring, its
access to the e-mail system, and the notice provided to the employees.”75
1. Company E-mail System v. Personal E-mail Account
¶23

While no factor alone is dispositive, focusing on an employer’s communications
policy, some courts have determined that employees have a lesser expectation of privacy
when they communicate via a company e-mail system as compared to a personal webbased account.76 In Stengart, in anticipation of discovery, the employer hired experts to
create a forensic image of the company laptop’s hard drive that Stengart had used,
including temporary Internet files.77 The experts accessed messages to and from
Stengart’s lawyer discussing the subject of a future lawsuit, for which she had used a
personal password-protected e-mail account instead of her company e-mail address.78
Focusing on the language of the company policy, the court found that Stengart had a
“subjective expectation of privacy” in these messages that was also “objectively
reasonable,” since the policy did not address personal accounts or warn employees that
the contents of personal account e-mails could be forensically retrieved.79 Thus, the
“[p]olicy created doubt about whether those e-mails [were] company or private
property.”80
¶24
In the 2006 Massachusetts case National Economic Research Associates, Inc. v.
Evans, an employee used a company laptop computer to send and receive attorney-client
communications by e-mail, using his personal password-protected Yahoo account.81
privacy), and Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.00-12143-RWZ, 2002 WL 974676,
at *1–2 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (finding no expectation of privacy exists where the employer periodically
reminds employees that company e-mail policy prohibits certain uses, the e-mail system belongs to the
company, and it could inspect e-mail usage, even though the employee created a password to limit access),
with United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 676–77 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists in password-protected computer files maintained in a locked office where the employer does
not disseminate a policy preventing storage of personal information on work computers or inform
employees that computer usage and Internet access would be monitored), Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d
64, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy exists where the employer does not have
a practice of routinely searching office computers and has not placed the employee on notice that he should
not have an expectation of privacy in his office contents, and the employee has a private office and
exclusive use of his workplace computer), and Haynes v. Office of the Attorney Gen., 298 F. Supp. 2d
1154, 1161–62 (D. Kan. 2003) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in private computer files
where employees are allowed to use workplace computers for private purposes, advised that unauthorized
access to user’s e-mail is prohibited, and given passwords to prevent access by others, despite a computer
screen warning that there should be no expectation of privacy).
74
See In re Asia Global Crossing, 322 B.R. at 258–59.
75
Id. at 259.
76
See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 662. The court also noted “[t]he location of the company’s computer may also
be a relevant consideration.” Id. at 663; see also supra note 73.
77
See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 656.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 663.
80
Id.
81
No. 04-2618-BLS2, 2006 WL 2440008, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2006).
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These e-mails were automatically stored in a temporary Internet file on the computer’s
hard drive, and later forensically retrieved at the direction of the employer.82 The
company manual permitted personal use of e-mail, “provided such use results in personal
time savings that can be (at least partially) applied toward work,”83 but warned that
computer resources were property of the company and that e-mails were not confidential
and could be read during routine checks.84 This notwithstanding, the Massachusetts court
found the employee’s expectation of privacy in e-mails with his attorney was reasonable,
primarily since
the Manual did not expressly declare, or even implicitly suggest, that NERA
would monitor the content of e-mail communications made from an employee’s
personal e-mail account via the Internet whenever those communications were
viewed on a NERA-issued computer. Nor did NERA warn its employees that the
content of such Internet e-mail communications is stored on the hard disk of a
NERA-issued computer and therefore capable of being read by NERA.85

The Massachusetts court also referenced the 1999 ABA formal opinion addressing
unencrypted e-mail, noting that “lawyers have a reasonable expectation of privacy when
communicating by e-mail maintained by an [on-line service provider].”86
¶25
In the 2007 New York case Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center, Inc., a physician
used his employer’s e-mail system to write several e-mails to his lawyer using his
employee e-mail address and the hospital e-mail server.87 The hospital’s computer and
communications policy stated that its system “should be used for business purposes
only,” that employees had “no personal privacy right in any material created, received,
saved or sent,” and that the employer “reserve[d] the right to access and disclose such
material at any time without prior notice.”88 Recognizing the employer’s right to regulate
its workplace, including the usage of its computers, the New York court determined that
the effect of the hospital’s policy was “to have the employer looking over your shoulder
each time you send an e-mail . . . [so that] the otherwise privileged communication
between Dr. Scott and [his lawyer] would not have been made in confidence because of
the [employer’s] policy.”89 The “no personal use” policy, combined with a policy
allowing employer monitoring, diminished any expectation of privacy for employees.90
¶26
Arguably, it is one thing when an employee uses company equipment and company
accounts to communicate with counsel, having knowledge that a restrictive company
policy is enforced. It is quite another thing when an employee uses company equipment
and a personal account that is password protected. In the former case—both subjectively

82

Id. At the instruction of the company’s lawyer, these e-mails were not reviewed pending guidance from
the court. Id. at *2.
83
Id. at *3.
84
Id. at *2.
85
Id. at *3.
86
Id. at *4 (quoting Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 58) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
87
847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
88
Id. at 439.
89
Id. at 440.
90
Id. at 443.
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and objectively—it seems that the expectation of privacy should be diminished.
Conversely, the expectation of privacy does not seem to be diminished in the latter case,
especially if personal use of company equipment is tolerated.
2. Use of a Company Computer as Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
¶27

It is well settled that voluntary disclosure of communications protected by attorneyclient privilege generally results in waiver of that privilege.91 It can be argued that,
depending on the nuances of a company policy, knowing and deliberate employee
communications on a company computer are not confidential. Or, if they are
confidential, it can be argued that such use is tantamount to a voluntary waiver of
privilege. Alternatively, when addressing the issue of waiver, some courts have
considered an employer’s forensic access to employee personal computer files as a matter
involving inadvertent disclosure.92 However, one court noted that “[a]ssuming a
communication is otherwise privileged, the use of the company’s e-mail system does not,
without more, destroy the privilege.”93 While mere use of a company’s e-mail system
may not destroy privilege, use of a company system, coupled with knowledge of a
company policy that diminishes privacy, might.
¶28
In the 2006 case Kaufman v. SunGard Investment Systems, the issue of voluntary
waiver arose when Kaufman exchanged e-mails with her lawyer from her companyowned computer, which were sent from and received on her employer’s e-mail system.94
She deleted some communications, but others remained on the company computers. The
employer used a computer technician to recover and restore these communications, which
Kaufman claimed were privileged.95 The magistrate judge determined that all the
communications were discoverable since the attorney-client privilege had been waived.96
With respect to the communications that remained on the company computers, the
reviewing court affirmed the magistrate judge’s decision that Kaufman failed to take
reasonable measures to ensure the confidentiality of the communications.97 Because the
court found that Kaufman’s actions were “knowing and deliberate,” the privilege was
waived as a voluntary disclosure.98 With respect to the e-mails Kaufman deleted, the
91

See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18–30 and accompanying text. When privilege is claimed on the grounds that a
communication was made in confidence in the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the communication is
presumed to have been made in confidence, and the party opposing the claim of privilege has the burden of
proof to establish the non-confidentiality of that communication. See, e.g., People v. Jiang, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d
184, 202–03 (Cal. App. 2005). The burden then shifts, and the party opposing the claim of privilege must
overcome this presumption and prove that the communications were not confidential. Id.
93
In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). The court also referenced
Formal Opinion 99-413 of the American Bar Association in its analysis. Id. at 256 (citing Formal Op. 99413, supra note 58).
94
No. 05-cv-1236 (JLL), 2006 WL 1307882, at *1 (D.N.J. May 10, 2006).
95
Id.
96
Id. at *2.
97
Id. at *3.
98
Id. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, claiming the magistrate judge should have applied state privilege
law to all claims asserted. Id. at *2. The court determined that state privilege law should govern and that
the magistrate judge’s “determination that Kaufman’s knowing and voluntary disclosure of the e-mail at
issue waived any privilege, accords with New Jersey law.” Id. at *3. Under New Jersey law, “the attorneyclient privilege is waived when a privilege holder ‘without coercion and with knowledge of his right or
92
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reviewing court also affirmed that she waived any privilege attached to those
documents.99 The court considered the company policy, which called for monitoring,
claimed a property interest in all information, and stated that employees should not
consider items created with company property private.100 Kaufman’s knowing use of the
company network, coupled with knowledge of the company policy, amounted to waiver
of any privilege that might attach.101
¶29
In the 2007 case Banks v. Mario Industries of Virginia, Inc., waiver of privilege
was also at issue.102 Employee Cook created a document on his work computer, printed
it, and sent it to his lawyer for purposes of seeking legal advice.103 Cook subsequently
deleted the document, but Mario’s forensic computer expert retrieved the document from
the computer’s hard drive. Mario Industries permitted their employees to use their work
computers for personal business; however, the employee handbook provided there was no
expectation of privacy regarding company computers.104 The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed that the document should be admitted into evidence, stating that “the [attorneyclient] privilege is waived where the communication takes place under circumstances
such that persons outside the privilege can overhear what is said.”105
¶30
The matter of inadvertent waiver was at issue in the 2006 case Curto v. Medical
World Communications, Inc., where a forensic consultant restored portions of personal
computer files and e-mails that former employee Curto had deleted from her company
laptops.106 The company had a usage policy which prohibited personal use of computers,
allowed their personnel to access and review all employee materials, and provided that
“[e]mployees expressly waive any right of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or
receive on the computer or through the Internet or any other computer network.”107
Employing a mechanism similar to the popular “balancing test,”108 the New York
magistrate called for the balancing of four relevant factors:
[1] the reasonableness of the precautions taken by the producing party to prevent
inadvert[e]nt disclosure of privileged documents; [2] the volume of discovery
versus the extent of the specific disclosure [at] issue; [3] the length of time taken

privilege, made disclosure of any part of the privileged matter or consented to such a disclosure made by
anyone.’” Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-29 (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation)).
99
Id. at *4.
100
Id. (“SunGard [policy] warned: The Company has the right to access and inspect all electronic systems
and physical property belonging to it. Employees should not expect that any items created with, stored on,
or stored within Company property will remain private. This includes desk drawers, even if protected with
a lock; and computer files and electronic mail, even if protected with a password.”).
101
Id. The federal district court also affirmed the magistrate judge’s ruling that, in light of the company
policy, Kaufman had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the communications at issue. Id.
102
650 S.E.2d 687 (Va. 2007).
103
Id. at 695.
104
Id. The employee handbook prohibited “the unauthorized removal of files from the computer and
information systems, removing or copying Mario’s documents, removing company property, and personal
use of Mario’s computer and information systems that was detrimental to Mario.” Id. at 690.
105
Id. at 695–96 (alteration in original) (quoting Clagett v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 263, 270 (Va.
1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106
No. 03CV6327, 2006 WL 1318387, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006).
107
Id.
108
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

579

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

[2011

by the producing party to rectify the disclosure; and [4] the overarching issue of
fairness.109

¶31

Added to these four factors was a fifth “subfactor” to be considered, “whether or
not there was enforcement of [any computer usage] policy,”110 which the reviewing court
found to be “a ‘subset’ of the first factor [relating to] the reasonableness of precautions
taken.”111 The magistrate noted that lack of enforcement of a computer usage policy
“created a ‘false sense of security’ which ‘lull[ed]’ employees into believing that the
policy would not be enforced.”112 The magistrate determined, and the reviewing court
affirmed, that Curto had not waived her right to assert the attorney-client privilege and
work-product protection.113 Regarding precautions taken, Curto sent e-mails via “her
personal AOL account which did not go through [the company’s] servers and she
attempted to delete the material before turning in her laptops.”114 Regarding the volume
of material disclosed, “limited items” were involved.115 As to the time taken to rectify
disclosure, her response was “rather immediate, upon notification.”116 And as to the last
factor, fairness “weighed in [Curto’s] favor because clients should be encouraged to
provide full disclosure to their attorneys without fear that their disclosure will be
invaded.”117
3. Use of a Company Computer as Waiver of Work-Product Immunity

¶32

Along with assertions that attorney-client privilege protects documents sent and
received between a lawyer and client are claims that some material generated is protected
by the qualified privilege of work product.118 Work-product immunity does not depend
on an intent that it remain confidential, although a waiver will occur when information is
voluntarily disclosed to an adversary.119 However, “no waiver attends a disclosure that

109

Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *3 (alteration in original).
Id. (alteration in original).
111
Id. at *5.
112
Id. at *3 (alteration in original). There were approximately four instances in which employee computer
use was monitored, which “occurred under very limited circumstances,” namely at the specific request of
someone at the company. Id. One instance involved an employee allegedly downloading pornographic
material, another involved poker playing on the Internet, and a third involved an employee allegedly
conducting an outside business. Id.
113
Id. at *3, *5. While reserving decision on the issue of privilege itself, the court noted that it was
reasonable for Curto to believe her e-mails and personal documents were confidential. Working from a
home office and not the offices of her employer, Curto’s computers were not connected to her employer’s
computer server; therefore, use could not be monitored nor could e-mails be intercepted. For her employer
to access documents on her laptops, the equipment would have to be physically transported to the
employer’s offices, or someone from the employer’s office would have to examine them in her home. Id. at
*5.
114
Id. at *3. The magistrate noted that other company employees, including the president, had personal
AOL accounts on their company computers. Id. at *3 n.2.
115
Id. at *3.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
119
See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975).
110
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has not ‘substantially increased the opportunities for potential adversaries to obtain
information.’”120
¶33
In the 2005 case In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., the company maintained that the
transmission of e-mails over the company e-mail system waived any privilege that might
attach under the work-product doctrine.121 The employees contended that, to the extent
there was any disclosure of privileged material, the disclosure was inadvertent rather than
voluntary.122 The court took up the matter by analyzing the communications from the
perspective of inadvertent disclosure, balancing the four factors of reasonableness of
precautions, volume of discovery, time taken to rectify the matter, and overarching
fairness.123 However, the court determined that the question of inadvertence could not be
resolved on the record as it existed since no distinction had been made between opinion
and non-opinion work product.124 “If the documents included opinion work product, the
[employees] could not have waived it.”125
¶34
In Curto, the plaintiff asserted that many of the documents retrieved from the
employee’s company laptop computer were protected from disclosure by attorney workproduct immunity.126 However, rather than treating attorney-client privilege and workproduct immunity as two separate entities, they appear to have been addressed in
tandem.127 In doing so, the court noted the appropriateness of the four factor examination
“in analyzing whether ‘the producing party’s conduct was so careless as to suggest that it
was not concerned with the [protection] of the asserted privilege.’”128 Reviewing the
magistrate judge’s analysis of the four factors, along with the fifth factor of company
policy enforcement, it was determined that the magistrate judge’s determination
upholding the right to assert the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection
was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.129
4. Attorney Notices and Disclaimers
¶35

The majority of communications at issue in these matters involve electronic
exchanges between a lawyer and client. Employers have forensically recovered and
retrieved communications on company equipment that have been sent by a client to a
lawyer, as well as transmissions from a lawyer to a client. Often, a lawyer’s e-mails
contain boilerplate language that addresses the issue of confidentiality and the privileged

120

In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.; see Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327, 2006 WL 1318387, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May
15, 2006).
124
See In re Asia Global Crossing, 322 B.R. at 263; see also notes 30–34 and accompanying text.
125
In re Asia Global Crossing, 322 B.R. at 263.
126
See Curto, 2006 WL 1318387, at *2.
127
The plaintiff asserted that identified documents “should be protected from disclosure under the attorneyclient privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine.” Id. The magistrate judge subsequently held the
plaintiff “had not waived her right to assert the attorney-client privilege or work product protection” as to
the documents identified, which the reviewing court affirmed. Id. at *2, *8.
128
Id. at *4 (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Cassano, 189 F.R.D. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
129
Id. at *5, *8.
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nature of the communication. However, these notices do not appear to afford the
protection for confidential communications that might be warranted.
¶36
In the Scott case, within each of the e-mails Dr. Scott’s lawyer sent to Dr. Scott’s
hospital e-mail account was a notice that the “message is intended only for the use of the
Addressee and may contain information that is privileged and confidential.”130 Dr. Scott
claimed the e-mails were privileged under both the attorney-client privilege and workproduct doctrine, while the hospital claimed both privileges were waived by use of the
system.131 With respect to the issue of work product protection, the court noted that in
New York, “inadvertent production of a privileged work product document generally
does not waive the applicable privilege.”132 However, “there is an exception to that rule
if the producing party’s conduct ‘was so careless as to suggest that it was not concerned
with [the] protection of [the] asserted privilege.’”133 Dr. Scott asserted that his lawyer’s
notice “is enough to take it out of the exception regarding inadvertent disclosure.”134
Focusing on the issue of confidentiality and the lawyer’s pro forma notice, the court
stated that “[t]he notice might be sufficient to protect a privilege if one existed,” but such
notice did not alter the hospital’s policy.135 Neither was a right to confidentiality created,
nor was the notice “a reasonable precaution to protect its clients” when client confidences
were at risk.136
¶37
While a pro forma notice which accompanies a lawyer’s communication might not
be a reasonable precaution to protect clients in given circumstances, it should alert a
reader of the communication of the nature of the document. When forensically retrieved
material that might be considered privileged comes into the hands of a lawyer,
obligations under Model Rule 4.4(b) are triggered.137 In Stengart, lawyers retained a
computer forensic expert to retrieve e-mails that were automatically saved on the
employee’s company issued laptop.138 The lawyers reviewed the e-mails, and used the
contents of at least one e-mail between Stengart and her attorney in responding to
interrogatories.139 The court acknowledged that the employer’s attempt to preserve
evidence to defend a civil lawsuit was legitimate, but stated that failing to set aside
arguably privileged messages was error.140 Once they realized that attorney-client
130

Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
Id. at 438–39. Dr. Scott claimed the communications were made in confidence and attempted to rely on
a court rule “which states: ‘no communication under this article shall lose its privileged character for the
sole reason that it is communicated by electronic means or because persons necessary for the delivery or
facilitation of such electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication.’” Id. at
440 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548 (McKinney 2002)).
132
Id. at 443. “Under New York State law, work product is waived when it is disclosed in a manner that
materially increases the likelihood that an adversary will obtain the information.” Id.
133
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting SEC, 189 F.R.D. 83, 85 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
134
Id. at 444.
135
Id.; see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
136
Scott, 847 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
137
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
138
Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 655 (N.J. 2010).
139
Id. at 656, 666.
140
Id. at 665–66. Attorney error was also noted in the 2009 case Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, in which
legal advice on an issue was sought by Subilia from his daughter, who was admitted to practice in Maine.
974 A.2d 918, 922 (Me. 2009). Subilia’s daughter referred her father to a law firm which produced a
memorandum and e-mailed it to her daughter, who forwarded it to Subilia’s company e-mail address. Id.
131
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communications were accessed, the lawyers should have notified Stengart or sought the
court’s permission before reading further, pursuant to Rule 4.4(b).141
IV. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN WITH CITY OF ONTARIO V. QUON
¶38

Courts have struggled when addressing issues relating to privacy in the workplace
and use of a company computer as waiver of attorney-client privilege. Many of the
decisions have essentially centered on an employee’s objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy when communicating with an attorney. When the Supreme Court heard
arguments in City of Ontario v. Quon, many hoped that some definitive direction on the
matter of employee expectation of privacy when using employer-provided
communications equipment would be forthcoming. However, in its opinion, the Court
declined to take this path.142 While the decision provides useful information, the Court
noted that “[p]rudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case are used to
establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy
expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided communication
devices.”143
¶39
In City of Ontario v. Quon, the City acquired pagers capable of sending and
receiving messages, which were issued to Quon and other officers in the police

Each page of the memorandum contained the notice: “ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE
CONFIDENTIAL WORK PRODUCT.” Id. Counsel for Fiber Materials found this memorandum on
Subilia’s company owned laptop hard drive and read it at least twice. Id. at 923. Because of its content and
markings, counsel contacted the ABA Ethics Search Service in deciding what to do next and received
materials from the ABA to review. Id. Counsel also consulted a Maine Assistant Bar Counsel who said she
would get back to her. Id. However, counsel turned the laptop over to company officials before bar counsel
called her back. Id. The court noted:
Presented with an obvious and important ethical issue in this uncharted area of the law in
Maine, Attorney Beedy was right to seek guidance from all possible sources before deciding
what to do with a memo from a law firm stamped “ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE.”
Having appropriately sought an advisory opinion from Bar Counsel, one of the best sources
of ethical advice for Maine attorneys, prudence and good practice would strongly suggest
obtaining an affirmative answer before embarking upon a potentially risky course of action.
It seems equally evident that, having just delivered the memo to FMI officials, a reasonable
attorney would return Bar Counsel’s phone call to get an expert opinion before a potential
legal case progressed. Attorneys do not act more ethically by avoiding relevant but
potentially unwelcome information.
Id. at 928.
141
See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 666. The New Jersey version of Rule 4.4(b) is based on the Model Rule,
providing as follows:
A lawyer who receives a document and has reasonable cause to believe that the document
was inadvertently sent shall not read the document or, if he or she has begun to do so, shall
stop reading the document, promptly notify the sender, and return the document to the sender.
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2011). The employer argued that Rule 4.4(b) was inapplicable,
since Stengart inadvertently left the e-mails on her laptop rather than sending them. See Stengart, 990 A.2d
at 665–66. The court disagreed. Id. at 666. They were not “items that were simply left behind” in that,
unbeknown to Stengart, they were automatically saved on the laptop’s hard drive and retrieved by a
forensic expert. Id.
142
See Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010).
143
Id. at 2629.
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department.144 Although the police department had an official policy calling for
monitoring and stating that users should have no expectation of privacy, a superior had
announced an informal policy of allowing some personal use of the pagers.145 Ontario’s
service contract called for a monthly limit on the number of characters each pager could
send and receive, with overage resulting in additional fees.146 When Quon initially
exceeded his monthly character limit, he paid the City an overage fee for several
months.147 When Quon and other officers exceeded their monthly character limits for a
number of months running, the police department sought to determine whether the
character limit was too low. That is, whether officers had to pay fees for sending workrelated messages or whether the overages were for personal messages.148 The City
obtained transcripts of Quon and another officer’s text messages for August and
September of 2002, looking at off-duty message time and whether on-duty messages
related to police business.149 It was discovered that many of Quon’s messages were not
work-related and that some were sexually explicit; as a result, Quon was disciplined.150
¶40
Quon and other respondents alleged that the City violated their Fourth Amendment
rights when transcripts of their pager messages were obtained and reviewed.151 The
district court denied the constitutional claims, determining that, while Quon had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his messages, the City’s audit was for
a legitimate purpose; thus, the Fourth Amendment was not violated.152 However, the
Ninth Circuit disagreed. Although it found that Quon had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his text messages, the court concluded that the legitimate search was not

144

Id. at 2624–25.
Id. at 2625–26. The official policy provided that the City “reserves the right to monitor and log all
network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice. Users should have no
expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.” Id. at 2625. Quon, furthermore,
signed a statement acknowledging that he had read and understood the policy. Id. “Although the Computer
Policy did not cover text messages by its explicit terms, the City made clear to employees, including Quon,
that the City would treat text messages the same way as it treated e-mails.” Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 2626.
149
Id.
150
Id. The audit of Quon’s text messages noted that he
sent or received 456 messages during work hours in the month of August 2002, of which no
more than 57 were work related; he sent as many as 80 messages during a single day at work;
and on an average workday, Quon sent or received 28 messages, of which only 3 were related
to police business.
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 2626–27. While the District Court found that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
content of his messages, it was the intent of the audit which would determine if it was nonetheless
reasonable.
“[I]f the purpose for the audit was to determine if Quon was using his pager to ‘play games’
and ‘waste time,’ then the audit was not constitutionally reasonable”; but if the audit’s
purpose “was to determine the efficacy of the existing character limits to ensure that officers
were not paying hidden work-related costs, . . . no constitutional violation occurred.”
Id. at 2627 (alteration in original) (quoting Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1146 (C.D. Cal. 2006)). The jury determined that the audit was ordered to determine character limit
efficacy, so the Fourth Amendment was not violated. Id.
145
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reasonable in scope since there were less intrusive means that could have been used to
determine character limit efficacy.153 The Supreme Court found this was error. The
search of Quon’s text messages was reasonable and did not violate his Fourth
Amendment rights.154
¶41
The parties in the case disagreed about whether Quon had a reasonable expectation
of privacy. The City claimed its official policy established that pager messages were not
to be considered private.155 Quon asserted that statements by a superior overrode the
official policy, so that employees could expect that the content of messages would remain
private.156 However, the Supreme Court declined to engage in a discussion of matters
that would “bear on the legitimacy of an employee’s privacy expectation.”157 Noting
matters such as rapid changes in communication and information transmission,158
evolution of work place norms,159 and recent statutory enactments,160 the Court
mentioned that “[a] broad holding concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis
employer-provided technological equipment might have implications for future cases that
153

Id.
Id. at 2633.
155
Id. at 2629.
156
Id.
157
Id. The Supreme Court “agreed with the general principle that ‘[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer.’” Id. at
2628 (alteration in original) (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
With respect to the proper analytical framework for Fourth Amendment claims against government
employers, the four-Justice plurality in O’Connor put forward a two step analysis:
First, because “some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public
that no expectation of privacy is reasonable,” a court must consider “[t]he operational realities
of the workplace” in order to determine whether an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are
implicated. On this view, “the question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.” Next, where an employee has a
legitimate privacy expectation, an employer’s intrusion on that expectation “for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.”
Id. (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725–26) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). However, Justice
Scalia took a different approach in his concurring opinion in O’Connor, dispensing with an inquiry into
operational realities, and concluding “that the offices of government employees . . . are covered by Fourth
Amendment protections as a general matter.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at
731 (Scalia, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, he noted “that government
searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules—searches of the
sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context—do not violate the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
158
Id. at 2629. The Court noted these changes are “evident not just in the technology itself but in what
society accepts as proper behavior.” Id.
159
Id. at 2630 (“Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may
consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.
That might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. On the other hand, the ubiquity of those
devices has made them generally affordable, so one could counter that employees who need cell phones or
similar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for their own. And employer policies concerning
communications will of course shape the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially to the
extent that such policies are clearly communicated.”).
160
Id. The Court noted that “the law is beginning to respond to these developments, as some States have
recently passed statutes requiring employers to notify employees when monitoring their electronic
communications.” Id.
154
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cannot be predicted.”161 Preferring to dispose of the case on “narrower grounds,” the
Court assumed that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages
sent on his city-provided pager.162 Additionally, the Court assumed that the City’s
review of his message transcripts was a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and that “the principles applicable to a government employer’s search of an
employee’s physical office apply with at least the same force when the employer intrudes
on the employee’s privacy in the electronic sphere.”163
¶42
The Supreme Court determined that the City’s search of Quon’s text messages was
reasonable.164 “Although as a general matter, warrantless searches ‘are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,’” there is an exception for “the ‘special
needs’ of the workplace.”165 Here there were “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search [was] necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose” regarding the
character limit issue, and a two month review was not “excessively intrusive.”166 The
Court concluded that “[b]ecause the search was motivated by a legitimate work-related
purpose, and because it was not excessive in scope, the search was reasonable”167 and
“would be ‘regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context.’”168

161

Id.
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. Relying on the O’Connor plurality, the Supreme Court stated that a “government employer’s
warrantless search is reasonable if it is ‘justified at its inception’ and if ‘the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of’ the
circumstances giving rise to the search.” Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987)
(plurality opinion)). However, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion takes the position that “the proper
threshold inquiry should not be whether the Fourth Amendment applies to messages on public employees’
employer-issued pagers, but whether it applies in general to such messages on employer-issued pagers.” Id.
at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring).
166
Id. at 2631 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that it “has
‘repeatedly refused to declare that only the “least intrusive” search practicable can be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.’” Id. at 2632 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995)).
167
Id. (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726).
168
Id. at 2633 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732). The Court notes that its treatment satisfies the
approach taken in the plurality, as well as the approach taken in Justice Scalia’s concurrence in O’Connor.
Id. However, in a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia, he chides the majority for inadvertently boosting
the O’Connor plurality standard. Id. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Despite the Court’s insistence that it
is agnostic about the proper test, lower courts will likely read the Court’s self-described “instructive”
expatiation on how the O’Connor plurality’s approach would apply here (if it applied) as a heavy-handed
hint about how they should proceed. Litigants will do likewise, using the threshold question whether the
Fourth Amendment is even implicated as a basis for bombarding lower courts with arguments about
employer policies, how they were communicated, and whether they were authorized, as well as the latest
trends in employees’ use of electronic media. In short, in saying why it is not saying more, the Court says
much more than it should.”) (citation omitted).
162
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V. FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS
A. Public Policy
¶43

Free communication between a lawyer and client is considered to be a significant
benefit to society.169 As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, the purpose behind the
attorney-client privilege is to “encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance
of law and administration of justice.”170 While narrow construction of the privilege has
been called for,171 courts are mindful that “the privilege carries through policy
purposes,”172 which are the foundation of the doctrine. These purposes are evident in the
2007 Western District of Washington case Sims v. Lakeside School.173
¶44
In Sims, employer Lakeside School obtained possession of employee Sims’s laptop
and made an image of his hard drive. Its electronic communications policy, set forth in
the employee manual, stated that user “[a]ccounts are property of Lakeside School and
are to be used for academic and administrative purposes only.”174 Regarding the school’s
e-mail system, the employee manual declared: “Lakeside does not assure the
confidentiality of e-mail.”175 The employee acknowledged that he had read and reviewed
the policy, leading the court to determine that Sims did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents of his laptop or in the e-mails he sent and received using the
school’s e-mail accounts.176 In contrast, the court extended protection under attorneyclient privilege to Sims’ web-based e-mails as well as other materials Sims prepared to
communicate with his counsel.177 The court noted that “[n]otwithstanding defendant
Lakeside’s policy in its employee manual, public policy dictates that such
communications shall be protected to preserve the sanctity of communications made in
confidence.”178 The court relied on the precedent that “the attorney-client privilege is
predicated upon the belief that it is in the public interest to encourage free and candid
communications between clients and their attorneys, by protecting the confidentiality of
such communications.”179
¶45
Policy regarding privilege was also an issue in Stengart, in which the court
acknowledged the “important public policy concerns underlying the attorney-client
privilege,”180 which is “enshrined in history and practice.”181 With regard to the
169

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
171
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
172
In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 360 (3d Cir. 2007).
173
No. C06-1412RSM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69568 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 20, 2007).
174
Id. at *2 (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted).
175
Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176
Id.
177
Id. at *4. Plaintiff Sims also asserted that materials generated to communicate with his wife were
protected under marital privilege. Id. at *5. The court agreed and extended protection to communications
between Sims and his wife. Id.
178
Id. at *4.
179
Id. at *5 (citing United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915)). In Curto, the
court considered the matter when balancing the factor of fairness, noting “clients should be encouraged to
provide full disclosure to their attorneys without fear that their disclosure will be invaded.” Curto v. Med.
World Commc’ns, Inc., No. 03CV6327, 2006 WL 1318387, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006).
180
Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 665 (N.J. 2010).
170
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communications retrieved by the employer from the computer Stengart used, the court
stated:
They are conversations between a lawyer and client about confidential legal
matters, which are historically cloaked in privacy. Our system strives to keep
private the very type of conversations that took place here in order to foster
probing and honest exchanges.182

¶46

While matters relating to expectation of privacy and waiver seem to be the central
focus of much judicial scrutiny, the public’s interest in the policies underlying the
attorney-client privilege must not be brushed aside. The historic values behind the
privilege should be paramount. This does not mean that a company’s communication
policy should not regulate use or provide for monitoring employee communications.
However, “allowing employers to use technologically sophisticated methods to covertly
intercept attorney-client communications could allow the employer to fold the protections
of privilege into a paper tiger.”183 In balancing the public interest in fostering open
exchanges between a lawyer and client, an employer’s right and responsibility to control
the workplace environment, and the factual circumstances surrounding an employee’s
exchange of information, protecting privileged communications should carry a heavy
weight.
B. Lawyer Responsibility

¶47

It is clear that the legal mandates surrounding the issues of privacy in the
workplace vary. As a result, lawyers must tread with caution when communicating with
their clients. A fundamental value within the legal profession, reflected in an initial
Model Rule, is that of competence.184 Lawyers who communicate electronically with
clients must be aware of the “perils associated with electronic transmission of
documents.”185 For instance, with respect to digital documents and metadata,186 it has
181

Id. at 659.
Id. at 664.
183
Losey, supra note 64, at 1188.
184
Model Rule 1.1 provides as follows:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009).
185
Hill, supra note 15, at 52.
186
Metadata is hidden information in digital documents. It accompanies every word document unless it is
removed, a process usually called “scrubbing.” See Martin Whittaker, Speakers Examine Metadata
Phenomenon and Explore Whether Lawyers Should Fear It, 23 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
305 (June 13, 2007). In addition,
metadata falls into categories, the first of which is data that is generated and stored in a
document by the software used to create it. Software generated metadata, sometimes referred
to as system metadata, appears on the drafter’s disk drives. While it does not appear in the
on-screen or printed version of a document, typically, it can be accessed relatively easily. A
second type of metadata, sometimes referred to as substantive metadata, is generated by the
person who created the document. This metadata can track the revision history of a document
and can either appear in the on-screen or printed version of the document, or be hidden from
182
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been indicated that failure to stay abreast of technological developments may indicate a
lack of reasonable care.187 It may also indicate a lack of competence.
¶48
An ethics opinion of the ABA stated that when extraordinarily sensitive material is
being communicated, enhanced security measures might be warranted.188 Arguably, in
this digital age, lawyers have an obligation to be even more vigilant when communicating
information to a client that might be considered privileged. For instance, in Scott, Dr.
Scott’s lawyer sent sensitive material to Dr. Scott’s work e-mail account which was
received over the Beth Israel e-mail server.189 It seems that transmitting sensitive
material to a client’s work e-mail account should have raised red flags for the lawyer.
This conduct, in and of itself, might result in a waiver of opinion work product. In light
of the fact that many companies have electronic communication policies that could
impact the matter of privileged material, lawyers must be on guard with their own
transmissions and alert clients of impending risks.
¶49
In Scott, the concern of communicating with a client via the client’s work e-mail
address should have been apparent to the lawyer. However, even if communications are
being sent to a private address which is password protected, lawyers should still tread
cautiously. Since the actual equipment being used by a client may not be apparent,
lawyers should alert clients of risks and the possible impact that use of company
equipment can have. As noted in Scott, a pro forma notice in a lawyer’s communication
is not a sufficient protection. While it might protect a privileged communication if one
exists, it does not alter company policy.190
VI. CONCLUSION
¶50

The twenty-first century has seen the proliferation of electronic communications in
business and private life. Employees are routinely issued company-owned computers,
the use of which typically is governed by a company policy addressing legitimate
view. A third type of metadata, sometimes referred to as embedded metadata, is “inferred
through a relationship to another document.” This metadata is data or content input by the
user which is not typically visible in the output display, such as spread sheet formulas, hidden
columns, linked files, database information or field codes. Metadata does not appear in the
final print-ready version of a final electronic document, but it can be easily accessed.
Hill, supra note 15, at 22–23 (footnotes omitted). The primary issue surrounding metadata concerns “an
electronic document, sent to a non-client, which may have confidential information available to a nonprivileged viewer. Questions arise as to whether this destroys the privileged nature of the document, as
well as” the responsibilities of lawyers who send and receive these documents. Id. at 23.
187
The New York State Bar Association concluded that under their disciplinary rules, lawyers have a duty
“to use reasonable care when transmitting documents by e-mail to prevent the disclosure of metadata
containing client confidences or secrets.” N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782, at 3
(2004). The Committee stated that what constitutes reasonable care will vary with the circumstances, but
noted it may “call for the lawyer to stay abreast of technological advances and the potential risks in
transmission in order to make appropriate decisions with respect to the mode of transmission.” Id. The
Florida Bar addressed the obligations of lawyers when transmitting electronic documents, noting such
obligations “may necessitate a lawyer’s continuing training and education in the use of technology in
transmitting and receiving electronic documents in order to protect client information.” Fla. Bar Prof’l
Ethics Comm., Op. 06-2 (2006).
188
See Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 58.
189
See Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
190
Id.
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business concerns. Employees’ expectations of privacy with respect to electronic
transmissions and files associated with this equipment vary. Usually, whether the
expectation of privacy is reasonable depends on nuances of the company’s policy, the
company’s monitoring practices relating to use, third parties’ right of access to material,
and the employee’s awareness of these matters.
¶51
Most companies allow employees to use company equipment for personal use.
However, along with this, many company policies claim ownership of workplace
communications, provide for access and review of transmissions, and alert employees
that their electronic exchanges are not to be considered private. Therefore, when an
employee uses a monitored company e-mail account on an employer-issued computer
having knowledge of this type of company policy, any expectation of privacy should be
diminished. Arguably, there is neither a subjective nor an objective privacy expectation
with these transmissions. Rather, either the transmissions are not confidential, or, if they
are considered confidential, use of this mechanism likely constitutes a voluntary waiver
of any privilege that would otherwise protect the communication.
¶52
Should an employee use company equipment to transmit a communication via a
personal account rather than a company account, it stands to reason that the expectation
of privacy increases. The expectation is especially increased if protective measures are
taken, such as using a personal account that is password-protected, deleting a message, or
intentionally not saving a message. In situations such as these, otherwise privileged
communications should be protected. A company policy attempting to hold otherwise
should be deemed unenforceable.
¶53
Notwithstanding the issues of privacy, confidentiality, and waiver, a lawyer who
has reason to believe a communication may be privileged should notify the sender of the
communication and comply with jurisdictional mandates before examining the content of
a transmission. Concomitant with this duty is the lawyer’s responsibility to see that
requisite care is taken when communicating with clients and to ensure that clients are
aware of the perils associated with electronic transmissions in the workplace. In the
recent U.S. Supreme Court case City of Ontario v. Quon, the Court addressed its
hesitance to embrace a broad holding on employee privacy expectation with references to
rapid changes in communication and information transmissions, evolution of work-place
norms, and recent statutory enactments. True—technology continues to evolve rapidly,
and the law, as well as legal professional mandates, scamper to keep up in its wake.
However, the benchmark public policy concerns that surround privilege issues, along
with the professional responsibility of lawyers, should be brought to the forefront.
Privacy and privilege are fundamental mandates which tip the balance in favor of
protecting these interests.
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